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Idsty's itig tion Strtey
Against Direct Infringers
[By Kristina Groennings* ]
n the fall of 2003, suing direct in-
fringers may have been the only
recourse left to the recording in-
dustry.1 The industry faced a
long-term trend of a decrease in
sales, due largely to file-sharing.
2
The decline in album sales follow-
ing the inception of Napster, from 1999
through 2002, had been the most dramatic in
the past 30 years.3 CD sales were down from
trict court. 6 In a desperate move to address
the P2P epidemic, the recording industry filed
a first round of lawsuits against its own fans
in September 2003.
7
In December 2003, the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals' decision in Verizon
complicated the litigation process by prohib-
iting the RIAA from using the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act's (DMCA) subpoena pro-
"The decline in album sales
following the inception of Napster,
from 1999 through 2002, had been
the most dramatic in the past 30
years.
$13.2 billion in 2000 to $11.2 billion in 2003.4
The industry's victory in Napster was fleeting,
as publicity over the issue increased aware-
ness of peer-to-peer (P2P) technology and us-
ers flocked to decentralized networks like
Grokster and KaZaa, making it more difficult
to track P2P use. 5 And in April 2003, the RIAA
lost its case of contributory and vicarious in-
fringement against Groskter in a California dis-
vision to compel Internet service providers
("ISPs") to disclose alleged infringers' identi-
ties.8 Without the benefit of the DMCA's sub-
poena provision, the RIAA must file "John
Doe" suits using alleged offenders' numerical
IP addresses. 9 Moreover, Doe defendants
have made motions to quash subpoenas, rais-
ing First Amendment, privacy, personal juris-
diction and improper joinder claims." Finally,
in the most recent setback for the RIAA's liti-
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gation strategy, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' affirmed the district court's decision in
Grokster that P2P networks Grokster and
Streamcast are not contributorily or vicariously
liable for users' direct infringement."
Despite the above obstacles, the RIAA
has proceeded, seemingly unfazed, in its litiga-
tion strategy.1 2 Its latest round of suits, in De-
cember 2004, targeted 754 more "Does." 13 This
Article analyzes the effectiveness of the
industry's litigation strategy against direct in-
fringers. Part I discusses the costs and benefits
of the lawsuits, concluding that the benefits
outweigh the costs. Part II offers suggestions
for additional ways the recording industry can
increase the efficiency of its enforcement efforts.
1. The Costs and Benefits of
Litigation against Individual File-
Sharers
Significant benefits to the music indus-
try provide insight into its persistence. Litiga-
tion has decreased user activity on targeted il-
legal sites like KaZaa and increased public un-
derstanding of the illegality of file-sharing.
Universities have adopted internal enforcement
mechanisms and joint initiatives with legitimate
online music providers. Finally, the increasing
popularity of legal sites like iTunes and the ini-
tiation of litigation by other organizations like
the MPAA also resulted from the RIAA's efforts.
On the other hand, though lawsuits have
curbed activity on targeted networks like
Fasttrack, a recent study suggests that overall
file-sharing levels have been unaffected, as us-
ers are abandoning targeted networks for lesser-
known, more sophisticated and secure P2P
networks. Moreover, the RIAA's strategy has
garnered resistance from civil rights organiza-
tions and caused the recording industry to fall
into disfavor with many Americans.
A. Benefits of Direct Enforce-
ment to the Recording Industry
The threat of a lawsuit will realistically
do little to deter hard-core pirates. However,
eliminating piracy altogether was never the
RIAA's goal.14 Studies show that many P2P
users do respond to the threat of litigation.
15
Although reports on P2P activity vary in their
depictions of the litigation's overall effect on file-
sharing, all reports confirm that the RIAA's suits
caused an initial, and possibly lasting, decrease
in file-sharing on mainstream, targeted sites like
KaZaa. Some studies also show that litigation
deters those who casually download and those
who have not yet engaged in criminal activity.
The predominant impact of the RIAA's strat-
egy, however, is evidenced in less direct conse-
quences of litigation that will combat piracy in
the long term.
1. Direct Benefits of the
Lawsuits
As a result of the litigation, networks
targeted by the recording industry have shown
a dramatic decrease in user base, both in the
short and long term. The RIAA initially directed
subpoenas at users who allowed their comput-
ers to be supernodes on the Fasttrack network
used by sites like KaZaa and Morpheus. 6
Nielsen/NetRatings reflect immediate flight
from the network, including a fifteen percent
drop in P2P usage of KaZaa and Morpheus, just
one week after the RIAA announced suits against
individuals. 7 Use of KaZaa alone dropped a
total of forty-one percent from the end of June
"The threat of a lawsuit will
realistically do little to deter
hard-core pirates.
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2003 (pre-announcement of suits) through Sep-
tember 2003 (post-filing of initial round of
suits).18 Data compiled by P2P research com-
pany, Big Champagne, demonstrates that
KaZaa's user base continued to drop, from 5.6
million users in October 2003 to 3.8 million in
June 2004.19
Moreover, studies by the Pew Internet
Project, a non-profit organization never retained
by the RIAA, reflect that the effect of litigation
was not limited to targeted sites. Survey re-
sults show that the total number of individuals
sharing files online dropped from twenty-eight
percent in June 2003 to twenty-three percent
in February 2004.2 Thirty-eight percent of
those in the April survey also claimed that they
were downloading fewer files because of the
RIAA suits, up from twenty-seven percent be-
fore the end of 2003.21 Reports from the NPD
Internet Research Group and Nielsen/
NetRatings support these findings.
22
2. Indirect Benefits of the
Litigation Campaign
RIAA suits against individual users have
also had broader social effects that may serve
the industry's goals. The litigation campaign
has raised public consciousness about the ille-
gality of downloading, has been a catalyst for
university deals with legitimate music sites, and
has helped spur the rise of legal sites such as
iTunes. In addition, other content owners cur-
rently pursuing litigation against direct infring-
ers benefit from the RIAA's initiatives.
a. Public Perception
of the Legality of File-
Sharing
Surveys demonstrate that the RIAA's
lawsuits have been successful in stigmatizing
downloading.23 In the fall of 2000, seventy-
eight percent of downloaders did not think that
saving music to their hard drives constituted
theft. As of April 2004, that number had
dropped to fifty-eight percent. 24 Between April
and October 2003, the number of teens who
stated that downloading is illegal increased from
27.5 to 43.1 percent.25 And, the number of
teens that viewed downloading as morally
wrong grew from one fifth in April 2003 to one
third in October 2003.26
b. Piracy on Univer-
sity Campuses
In its efforts to address piracy on col-
lege campuses, the RIAA has used a combina-
tion of soft and hardcore tactics, both pressing
charges against student infringers, and work-
ing with universities to implement long-term
solutions. As a result of this two-pronged strat-
egy, many universities started to administer
their own deterrent mechanisms, from creat-
ing copyright policies and methods for dealing
with copyright infringement to partnering with
legitimate music sites.
College campuses have been particu-
larly fertile ground for illegal P2P use, as stu-
dents with tight budgets in the prime music-
consuming age group enjoy access to high-
speed network connections provided by col-
leges.27 The RIAA has made efforts to educate
university leaders on file-sharing and urged
them to pass on information to students.
28
University-imposed repercussions for illegal
activity conducted using university networks
range from Internet disconnection to expulsion;
in combination with non-judicial efforts to ad-
dress piracy on college campuses, the RIAA
took legal action against students in 2003.29
After the initiation of lawsuits, the percentage
of Internet users ages eighteen to twenty-nine
admitting to downloading music dropped from
fifty-two to twenty-eight percent.
30
In addition, colleges and universities
have drastically changed the ways that students
can access digital entertainment content.31 As
of fall 2004, Napster, MusicNet, Rhapsody, and
iTunes all negotiated deals with multiple uni-
versities.3 2 Negotiations with legitimate music
services, coupled with university-imposed dis-
incentives for illegal P2P use, may work to re-
duce file-sharing among university students
immediately and ultimately to reduce illegal
downloading by encouraging respect for copy-
right at an early age.
c. The Rise of Legiti-
mate Options
While the RIAA believes that "litigation
is not a business strategy," legitimate business
models have been supported by the lawsuits.
33
When the illegal Napster was available, the cost
of downloading was zero and the cost of legal
music considerably greater at $17 per album.
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Now, due to the lawsuits, an illegal download
carries with it a risk of a $3000 fine, whereas
legitimate sites offer singles for only ninety-nine
cents.
Immediately following initiation of law-
suits, BuyMusic.com, the largest online store
for PC users, noted a thirty percent increase in
traffic on its site from September 6th to the
13th.34 As of April 2004, seventeen percent of
music downloaders claimed that they were us-
ing paid services, and over 11 million unique
Internet users had visited legitimate music sites,
including Musicmatch.com, Roxio, Inc. (the
new Napster), iTunes, Listen.com, Walmart, and
Liquid.com. 35 In addition, the percentage of
people who claim they would pay for legal
downloads is up from sixteen percent in 2003
to nineteen percent this year.
36
international suits by IFPI-affiliated organiza-
tions will be reciprocal. Only 45.1 percent of
American users download from other Ameri-
cans, 40 so the prosecution of uploaders by af-
filiated organizations in other countries will
work to decrease the amount of copyrighted
content that individuals in the United States
can access on illegal sites. Therefore, by setting
an example of a litigation strategy against users
that other content owners may learn from or
emulate, the RIAA stands to indirectly increase
the deterrence of alleged infringers, without
expending additional resources of its own.
B. Costs of direct enforcement
to the recording industry
While studies of P2P use all confirm that
there was an initial decrease in activity on RIAA-
targeted sites like KaZaa and Morpheus after
"Surveys demonstrate that the





One of the most beneficial outcomes of
the RIAA's bold initiation of lawsuits for the
record industry is that it paved the way for other
content owners to do the same. If the record-
ing industry's lawsuits against individuals had
no deterrent effect, it is unlikely that other con-
tent owners will pursue the same strategy. Yet
press reports indicate that 200 alleged offend-
ers are being targeted in the MPAA's first round
of litigation.37 The International Federation of
Phonographic Industries ("IFPI") had already
pursued suits against file-sharers in Germany,
Italy, and Denmark as of June 2004.38 The
broadcast industry is sure to follow in short
order.39 Moreover, because the same P2P net-
works that are being used to share music are
also being used to transmit movies, the ben-
efits of MPAA and RIAA domestic litigation and
the initiation of suits, studies simultaneously
show either a subsequent resurgence in file-
sharing on less visible networks, or that file-
sharing levels overall have not been affected by
litigation. In addition, reports indicate that in
response to the threat of litigation, users have
moved to less visible, more secure P2P networks
that employ technological measures to help
users avoid detection. Yet another inadvertent
effect of the RIAA's litigation strategy has been
its toll on the public image of record compa-
nies.
1. Effect on Overall, Long-
Term P2P Activity
Though the Pew Internet Project reports
that the percentage of individuals who down-
load music is still less than it was in the spring
of 2003,41 there has been a small resurgence in
file-sharing since the initiation of suits.42 An-
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other recent report by the University of Cali-
fornia, Riverside, and San Diego
Supercomputer Center ("UC study") alleges
that, although litigation caused a decrease in
use of networks such as Fasttrack targeted by
the lawsuits, 43 overall file-sharing has remained
unchanged, as users of those sites have simply
migrated to more secure and anonymous file-
sharing systems. 44
2. Increased Sophistica-
tion of P2P Networks
When the RIAA started disseminating
notices to Fasttrack network users of the ille-
gality of their activities via instant messaging
("IM"), the network changed IM default set-
tings, which prevented the RIAA from sending
messages. While this measure may have served
only to stem RIAA threats, other technological
adaptations may stymie online enforcement
efforts altogether. Morpheus, KaZaa Lite, and
Shareaza now help users identify IP addresses
of companies looking for pirates.45 Morpheus
also allows users to connect to a site that links
them to public proxy servers that mask users'
IP numbers.46 Moreover, a program called
"Waste" encrypts instant messaging and con-
tent sharing networks of up to fifty users.47
3. Public Image of the Re-
cording Industry
Perhaps the greatest casualty in the war
on piracy has been the public's perception of
the music industry. Possible explanations for
the negative publicity include the following:
first, unpopular prosecutions -for instance, the
RIAA received extensive negative publicity for
suing a twelve year old who lived in a New York
housing project.48 Second, the RIAA is fight-
ing an Internet culture based on the freedom
of information, which makes it more difficult
for the industry to justify copyright enforce-
ment to Internet users.49 Finally, civil rights
organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation, the American Civil Liberties Union and
Public Citizen have submitted amicus briefs on
behalf of Doe defendants and supported oppo-
sition to RIAA strategies.50
II. Proposals to Increase the Ef-
ficiency of Enforcement
Despite the above costs, the RIAA con-
tinues to pursue its litigation strategy. Yet with-
out the threat of litigation, it is likely that P2P
activity will at least remain at the level that it is
today. In addition, the lawsuits are helping to
change public attitudes and spur stakeholders
to implement long term solutions to file-shar-
ing. However, as there appears to be no sign of
cease-fire, it would be advantageous for the in-
dustry to consider more efficient means of fight-
ing this war.
There are many ways that the RIAA can
increase the efficiency of its enforcement strat-
egy. These include: putting more resources into
anti-piracy technology, supporting federal in-
tellectual property enforcement initiatives, im-
proving the quality of legitimate options, and
altering its litigation strategy.
A. Anti-Piracy Technology
The RIAA has attempted several tech-
nological solutions to the P2P problem, some
of which are more effective than others. The
most promising tactic to date may be "spoof-
ing," whereby P2P networks are flooded with
decoy music files. The recording industry is
using companies like Overpeer to implement
this tactic, which sends more than twenty-five
billion spoofed songs per month on the
Fasttrack network." Considering that the av-
erage song takes up to three minutes to down-
load, if the number of decoys is significant
enough, less committed users may think twice
about the time it could take them to find a qual-
ity copy of their favorite song. In addition to
spoofing, the RIAA should collaborate with the
MPAA to distribute technology for parents to
regulate file-sharing on home computers. The
MPAA is currently developing free software for
this purpose.
5 2
B. Urge Federal Enforcement
Using the NET Act
The No Electronic Theft Act ("NET Act")
is an important tool at the federal government's
disposal, yet there have been no reported pros-
ecutions of individual, smaller-scale P2P pirates
under the Act. Passed in 1997, the Act makes
willful copyright infringement a felony regard-
less of whether the infringer reaped actual fi-
nancial gain.53 This provision is key for P2P
enforcement, because under the Act, the gov-
393 Vanderbilt journal of Entertainment Law & F
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ernment can prosecute individuals that receive
"anything of value", including other copy-
righted works, in exchange for copyrighted
materials.-' In August 2004, the Justice Depart-
ment successfully prosecuted its first criminal
case against an organized P2P network.
55 If
used more liberally to impose criminal charges
against individual P2P users, the NET Act could
be a powerful deterrent of individual copyright
infringement above and beyond the civil suits
currently being filed by the RIAA.
C. Increase Attractiveness of Le-
gitimate Options
While illegal file-sharing now carries
risks of direct liability for copyright infringe-
ment and is more time consuming as a result
of spoofing and other tactics, legal alternatives
still require improvement in several respects in
order to compete with illegal file-sharing. The
recording industry could consider the follow-
ing options to make legal downloading more
attractive:
(1) License more of their products faster,
thereby increasing the amount of music avail-
able on legal sites. As of August 2004, the iTunes
Music Store had over one hundred million
sic more affordable for students. Some uni-
versities such as Pennsylvania State charge stu-
dents a $160 fee per semester in addition to the
ninety-nine cent fee per download. 61 Moreover,
because no single legitimate site currently of-
fers the quantity of music that illegal sites do,
students are more likely to take advantage of
an arrangement that offers access to multiple
legal sites.
(4) Facilitate compatibility of portable
digital music players with multiple legitimate
music sites. For instance, the iPod only plays
music purchased from iTunes. 61 By limiting
consumers to one service, users reluctant to
designate one source for all future music pur-
chases may instead resort to P2P networks.
D. Improve Educational Efforts
While the RIAA has been very vocal
about the effects of piracy on the record indus-
try as a whole, citing statistics of decreased CD
sales, unemployment, and decreased artist com-
pensation, the public needs more tangible ex-
amples of this reality. For example, a detailed
illustration of how illegal copies of lesser-known
artists' albums affect the artists' compensation
in relation to the costs of production, market-
"Perhaps the greatest casualty in
the war on piracy has been the
public's perception of the music
industry-'"
songs available.5 6 KaZaa offered ten times that
amount." Major artists such as Madonna and
the Red Hot Chili Peppers have also been re-
luctant to license single songs, instead forcing
users to purchase the whole album.58
(2) Increase public approval by giving
more to the artists. Apple receives over a third
of the revenues while contributing very little
resources to make digital music available on its
site. 59
(3) Renegotiate university licensing ar-
rangements with legitimate sites to make mu-
ing and distribution, might be more effective.62
The industry should also voice the long-term
effects of piracy and strive to further clarify
copyright law for the general public. It is just
as important to educate consumers on illegal
behavior as it is to clearly state what actions
consumers can legally take, such as making
copies for personal use.63
E. Alter Litigation Strategy
Finally, there are two ways in which the
RIAA may increase the effectiveness of its cur-
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rent litigation strategy: by making its targets
less predictable and by increasing the penalty
for illegal file-sharing.
Currently, the RIAA lawsuits exclusively
target uploaders, particularly those who upload
approximately 1,000 songs or more.64 File-
sharers can therefore evade the RIAA by up-
loading less than the target amount. The RIAA's
strategy would benefit from a less predictable
approach. The MPAA has employed this tactic
in its litigation strategy, as the first wave of suits
named seven alleged offenders who had only
shared one film.
6
In addition, recent case law suggests
that punitive damages may be available for
copyright owners who seek actual damages and
profits for willful and malicious infringement
as opposed to statutory damages.66 However,
the deterrence rationale for punitive damages
may already be served in an increase of the
maximum statutory damage award from
$20,000 to $100,000.67
Il1. Conclusion
The RIAA's litigation efforts against di-
rect infringers have led to an initial decrease in
file-sharing on P2P networks, have prompted
universities to adopt copyright policies and ini-
tiate negotiations with legitimate sites, and have
increased the appeal of legitimate sites. In ad-
dition, album sales increased for the first time
in several years by 4.7 percent in the last quar-
ter of 2003. In January 2004, sales showed a
10.4 percent increase since January of the pre-
vious year.68 Total sales in 2004 are predicted
to exceed those in the last two years, although
the rate of increase has slowed.
69
However, these gains have not come
without great costs. Studies call into question
the effectiveness of litigation on overall and long
term P2P activity. File-sharers are migrating to
more sophisticated P2P networks, making ille-
gal downloading more difficult to detect. Fur-
thermore, the recording industry has unques-
tionably suffered a major loss in the arena of
public perception.
Record companies realized the threat of
file-sharing late in the game and were forced to
play defense, seeking a swift response to the
problem. Many have criticized the RIAA for
not looking to other solutions first such as pur-
suing the online business model before resort-
ing to litigation. Yet, just as it would be unreal-
istic to expect a shop owner to stand by while
his goods are being shoplifted, it seems unfair
to expect an entire industry to remain idle when
faced with a potentially fatal piracy problem.
In an ideal world, an understanding that file-
sharing is illegal, and the mere threat of legal
repercussions, would be sufficient to win the
war on piracy. In the real world, one would be
hard pressed to find an industry that would
limit itself to one response and not avail itself
of all possible solutions to such a problem.
Moreover, it takes time for an entire industry
to alter a distribution model that has been imple-
mented for more than three decades.7"
The RIAA's litigation campaign therefore
provided an immediate answer to file-sharing
that is both defensible and effective on mul-
tiple fronts. Perhaps there are means by which
it can increase the effectiveness of its litigation
strategy and bolster its technological response
to file-sharing. In addition, it must propose new
initiatives to fight file-sharing in the long term.
To survive, it must answer the question of what
purpose the middleman should now serve.
71
Indeed, it may even have to compromise. The
recording industry cannot put an end to file-
sharing, but the faster it can adapt to this new
environment, the more quickly it can shift its
attention and resources from deterring file-shar-
ing to establishing a presence in the online busi-
ness community.
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